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There is conclusive evidence that information search processes are typically
biased in favor of the information seeker’s own opinion (confirmation bias).
Less is known about how knowledge about others’ opinions affects this
confirmatory information search. In the present study, the authors manipulated
feedback about others’ opinions and anticipation of group interaction. As
predicted, the effect of knowledge about others’ opinions on confirmatory
information search depended on whether participants anticipated interacting
with these others. Specifically, minority members anticipating a group
discussion exhibited a particularly strong confirmation bias, whereas minority
members who did not anticipate a discussion predominantly sought
information opposing their opinion. For participants not anticipating group
interaction, confidence about the correctness of one’s decision mediated the
impact of knowledge about others’ opinions on confirmatory information
search. Results are discussed with regard to the debiasing effect of preference
heterogeneity on confirmatory information search in groups.
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Throughout our lives, we actively search for and deal with new informa-tion. Remarkably, a large body of evidence shows that individuals have
a tendency to predominantly seek information supporting their opinions as
opposed to conflicting information. For example, individuals have been
found to favor information supporting their attitudes (Lundgren & Prislin,
1998), previous decisions (Frey, 1986), and stereotypes (Johnston, 1996).
This biased information search is likely to strengthen the information seek-
ers’ adherence to their position, even if this position is not justifiable based
on all of the available information (Pinkley, Griffith, & Northcraft, 1995).
Experimental studies on biased information search have predominantly
been carried out within the framework of cognitive dissonance theory
(Festinger, 1957). These studies have demonstrated that the preference for
supporting compared to conflicting information occurs when individuals
have decided voluntarily and with a certain amount of commitment on a
particular decision alternative (cf. Frey, 1986). In a prototypical study, par-
ticipants make a real or hypothetical decision and are subsequently offered
additional pieces of information in the form of statements by experts or for-
mer participants. Half of the statements argue in favor of and the other half
against the participants’ decision. Each statement is summarized by a main
thesis that makes it clear whether the statement supports or conflicts with
the participants’ decision. On the basis of these main theses, participants are
asked to select which statements they would like to read. If a participant
chooses more supporting than opposing statements, confirmatory informa-
tion seeking is said to occur. We refer to this preference for supporting over
conflicting information as confirmation bias.
Recent studies on biased information search in the context of decision
making have shown that biased information search is not restricted to situa-
tions in which a final decision has been made but can also occur after pre-
liminary decisions (Fischer, Jonas, Frey, & Schulz-Hardt, 2005; Jonas,
Schulz-Hardt, Frey, & Thelen, 2001). Furthermore, biased information search
can be generalized to situations in which new information is sought sequen-
tially rather than simultaneously (Jonas et al., 2001). Finally, biased informa-
tion search has also been demonstrated in the area of group decision making
(Kerschreiter, Schulz-Hardt, Mojzisch, & Frey, in press; Schulz-Hardt, Frey,
Lüthgens, & Moscovici, 2000; Schulz-Hardt, Jochims, & Frey, 2002).
All in all, there is conclusive evidence that a person’s own opinion influ-
ences his or her information search. By contrast, far less is known about
how the opinions of others affect this behavior. To illustrate, imagine you
are a member of a management board and have to decide whether the con-
tract of a manager should be extended or not. After careful consideration,
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you favor extending the contract. Then you learn that two other members of
the board favor letting the manager go. Will this knowledge make you even
more biased in your information search, or will it make you concentrate on
information that contradicts your opinion? In the same way, if the two other
members agree with you, will this knowledge influence the extent to which
you bolster your opinion by searching for supporting information?
Knowledge about such influences would have important implications for
group research. For example, previous research has demonstrated that
groups in which all members prefer the same decision alternative prior to
group discussion show a more pronounced confirmation bias after discus-
sion than do groups in which members expressed prediscussion disagree-
ment (Schulz-Hardt et al., 2000; Schulz-Hardt et al., 2002). In these studies,
groups first discussed a decision problem and were then given the opportu-
nity to select additional information that either supported or conflicted with
the decision of the group (similar to the studies on biased information
search at the individual level). Although these studies unequivocally
showed that dissent debiases group information search (i.e., groups con-
sisting of members with heterogeneous decision preferences search for
information in a more balanced way than do groups consisting of members
with homogeneous decision preferences), it is unclear whether this effect is
because of the expression of dissent during group interaction or because of
merely learning that other group members prefer different decision alterna-
tives. To better understand the effects of dissent, research that isolates the
effects of learning whether others hold a similar or a different position on
biased information search is needed. Stated differently, what is missing so
far is a baseline that allows the debiasing effect of prediscussion dissent in
groups to be more accurately interpreted.
Unfortunately, the two existing studies that were designed to investigate
the effect of learning other persons’ opinions on biased information search
yielded contradictory results. In the first study (Levine & Russo, 1995),
participants were led to believe that they would discuss a controversial
issue—the question of whether the insanity defense should be retained or
abolished—with five other people. Furthermore, they were informed that
they belonged to either a majority or a minority faction and that the minor-
ity was composed of either one or two persons. Prior to the discussion, par-
ticipants could read arguments supporting or opposing their position.
Levine and Russo (1995) observed that participants in all experimental con-
ditions spent more time reading supporting than opposing arguments.
Moreover, participants who anticipated being the only minority member in
a group discussion exhibited a particularly strong confirmation bias. In the
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second study (Nemeth & Rogers, 1996), participants who opposed propos-
als restricting college dormitory life were informed that either a minority
(20%) or a majority (80%) of the student population and of their own exper-
imental group favored the proposals. Afterward, they were given the oppor-
tunity to read articles detailing the reasons for opposing or favoring the
proposals. Nemeth and Rogers (1996) found that participants exposed to
minority dissent (i.e., majority members) searched for approximately the
same number of articles supporting versus conflicting with their opinion,
whereas participants exposed to majority dissent (i.e., minority members)
searched for more conflicting articles than supporting articles. In other
words, although majority members searched for information in an unbiased
fashion, minority members searched for information consistent with the
majority position, that is, they exhibited a disconfirmation bias. In sum-
mary, although Levine and Russo (1995) found that minority members
were particularly biased in favor of supporting information, Nemeth and
Rogers (1996) obtained the opposite result, namely, that minority members
showed a pronounced preference for conflicting information.
At this point, one might wonder whether there are any differences
between the two studies that might account for the contradictory results.
One important difference concerns the anticipation of discussion. Although
Nemeth and Rogers (1996) simply informed their participants about other
persons’ opinions, Levine and Russo (1995) led participants to expect that
they would participate in a face-to-face discussion with those others.
Knowing that others agree or disagree is, however, somewhat different from
anticipating a discussion with those others. Specifically, it is conceivable
that the two experimental settings are linked to different motivations.
According to the multiple-motive heuristic-systematic model (HSM;
Chaiken, Giner-Sorolla, & Chen, 1996; Chen & Chaiken, 1999), three
broad motives can be distinguished that predict the direction of information
processing. Accuracy motivation refers to the desire to hold beliefs and atti-
tudes that are objectively valid. Accuracy-motivated individuals aim to
understand the other persons’ opinions and, therefore, search for informa-
tion in a balanced or even self-critical way (Lundgren & Prislin, 1998).
Defensive motivation refers to an orientation toward reinforcing important
self-defining attitudes and beliefs. Defensive-motivated individuals aim to
maintain the stability of their cognitive system and, therefore, search for
information supporting their self-defining attitudes (Lundgren & Prislin,
1998). Finally, impression motivation refers to the desire to hold and
express attitudes and beliefs that are called for by the current interpersonal
situation. Specifically, if the opinions of significant others are known to the
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information seeker and if the information seeker’s opinion has not been dis-
closed to these others, a bias in the direction of the other persons’ opinions
has been found to occur. By contrast, if the information seeker’s opinion is
revealed to significant others, as, for example, at the beginning of a group
discussion, a confirmation bias emerges to make the opinion justifiable to
these others (Jonas, Schulz-Hardt, & Frey, 2005; Lundgren & Prislin, 1998;
Tetlock, 1992).
By drawing on the multiple-motive HSM, we propose that the mere
awareness of being in the minority induces a motivation to find out whether
the majority position is correct or not. Thus, people who are exposed to
majority dissent but who do not anticipate a discussion should search for
information consistent with the majority position on the basis of accuracy
concerns. By contrast, if minority members anticipate a discussion and
know that their opinion will be disclosed to the others, which is the case in
most group discussions because preferences are usually exchanged at the
outset (Gigone & Hastie, 1993), they should be motivated to bolster and
justify their position by searching for supporting information on the basis
of self-presentation concerns. Stated differently, merely learning that the
majority disagrees facilitates accuracy motivation, and this motivation
induces a self-critical information search. By contrast, the anticipation of
being a minority member in a forthcoming group discussion induces
impression motivation and, hence, leads to confirmatory information search.
Preliminary evidence supporting the idea that the impact of knowledge
about others’ opinions on biased information search is moderated by antic-
ipated group discussion is provided in a study by Van Hiel and Franssen
(2003). This study investigated the impact of group decision rule (majority
vs. unanimous rule) and prospective member status (minority vs. majority
member) on the information acquisition bias. Of particular relevance to our
hypothesis is the control condition in which participants expected no inter-
action. In summary, Van Hiel and Franssen found that minorities showed a
greater confirmation bias than majority factions, especially when the
minorities anticipated a group discussion. Unfortunately, a serious method-
ological limitation of this study precludes firm conclusions. Although par-
ticipants in the condition with anticipated group interaction were informed
about the opinions of the other participants in their group, participants in
the control condition with no anticipated interaction received abstract base-
rate information, that is, they were informed that 66% (or 33%) of all prior
participants agreed with their position. Thus, the manipulation of minority
and majority status differed across the two anticipation conditions. As a
consequence, the enhanced confirmation bias of minorities anticipating a
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discussion might be not because of anticipated interaction but because feed-
back about others’ opinions has more impact if these others are real persons
with whom the participants have direct contact.
The Present Study
The purpose of the present study was threefold. First, we sought to pro-
vide a methodologically rigorous test of the assumption that the impact of
feedback about others’ opinions on confirmatory information search is
moderated by the anticipation of a discussion with those others. To this end,
we orthogonally manipulated two factors: feedback about the opinions of
two other participants and anticipation of discussion. By contrast to the Van
Hiel and Franssen (2003) study, participants were informed about the opin-
ions of two of the other participants in their experimental session irrespec-
tive of whether they anticipated a discussion or not. Our main hypothesis
was that the effect of knowledge about others’ opinions on information
search is moderated by anticipated group interaction. Specifically, in the
conditions with anticipated interaction, minority members were predicted
to show a substantially higher confirmation bias than majority members (as
observed by Levine & Russo, 1995). By contrast, in the conditions with no
anticipated interaction, minority members, but not majority members, were
expected to show a disconfirmation bias (as observed by Nemeth & Rogers,
1996). Hence, the effect of anticipated interaction should be strongest for
minority members because it should turn the disconfirmation bias in the
condition with no anticipated interaction into a confirmation bias in the
condition with anticipated interaction.
The second goal of the present experiment was to shed light on the
processes underlying the interactive effects of knowledge about others’ opin-
ions and anticipated group interaction on confirmatory information search.
Apparently, the awareness of being in the minority should undermine one’s
confidence about the correctness of the decision irrespective of whether one
anticipates a group discussion or not. However, this decrease in confidence
should be differentially related to confirmatory information search depend-
ing on whether one anticipates a discussion or not. As outlined above, for
minority members who do not anticipate a discussion, the decrease in con-
fidence should induce a motivation to find out whether the majority position
is correct or not and, therefore, result in a decreased confirmation bias (or
even an increased disconfirmation bias). In other words, the less confident
people are, the more they will tend to search for information opposing their
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opinion (based on accuracy concerns). By contrast, for minority members
in the anticipated interaction condition, confidence should be negatively
related to confirmatory information search. The less confident minority
members are, the more they will doubt that they will be able to maintain
their stance in the forthcoming discussion or even persuade the majority
members and, hence, the more they will tend to search for information sup-
porting their opinion to compensate for this deficiency. In summary, confi-
dence about the correctness of one’s decision should mediate the effects of
opinion feedback on confirmatory information search, but these mediation
effects should be in opposite directions if further group interaction is antic-
ipated versus not anticipated.
The third goal of the present study was to extend past research on the
impact of knowledge about others’ opinions on biased information search
by including both a no-feedback control condition and a homogeneous
feedback condition in our experimental design. Note that only one study
(Levine & Russo, 1995) has involved a control condition in which partici-
pants received no feedback about the distribution of opinions in their group.
A no-feedback control condition is important because without such a con-
dition it is not possible to conclude whether differences between the major-
ity and the minority condition are because of minority feedback, majority
feedback, or both types of feedback. Moreover, none of the previous stud-
ies involved a homogeneous feedback condition, that is, a condition in
which participants learned that all other participants had reached the same
decision. A homogeneous feedback condition is, however, particularly wor-
thy of attention because previous studies in which biased information
search was measured at the group level have demonstrated that homoge-
neous groups exhibit a particularly pronounced confirmation bias (Schulz-
Hardt et al., 2000; Schulz-Hardt et al., 2002). Consequently, it would be
instructive to know whether anticipating a discussion with agreeing others
or even simply being aware that others agree is sufficient to yield a simi-
larly high confirmation bias to that observed in homogenous groups.
To summarize, the present study includes four levels of feedback in a
decision case with two alternatives: (a) a homogeneous condition in which
participants were led to believe that two other randomly chosen participants
in their experimental session had reached the same decision, (b) a majority
condition in which participants learned that one of these two participants
had reached the same decision (so that the participant and this person con-
stituted the majority faction), whereas the other participant had reached a
different decision, (c) a minority condition in which participants were
informed that the two other participants had reached the opposite decision,
Mojzisch et al. / Confirmatory Information Search 209
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and (d) a control condition in which participants received no feedback.
Within each of these four feedback conditions, participants either were led
to expect that they would participate in a group discussion with two other
participants or were told that no discussion would take place.
Method
Participants and Design
The sample included 170 students (102 female and 68 male, M = 24.63
years, SD = 4.81) from the University of Munich who participated in return
for course credit or received DM15.00 (about US$7.00) in exchange for
their participation. Participants were randomly assigned to the eight condi-
tions of a 4 (feedback about others’ opinions: homogeneous feedback vs.
majority feedback vs. minority feedback vs. no feedback) × 2 (anticipation
of group interaction: yes vs. no) between-subjects factorial design.
Procedure and Materials
Up to 10 participants were run in each session. The case study handed
out to the participants was identical to one used in other recent experiments
on confirmatory information search (e.g., Fischer et al., 2005). It deals with
a Mr. Miller who has a 1-year contract to manage a fashion store. The par-
ticipants’ and their bogus partners’ role was that of store owner. Participants
were informed that Mr. Miller’s contract was almost up and negotiations
about extending it were due to take place. Participants received information
showing that Mr. Miller’s success had been mixed.
Participants were asked to make a preliminary decision about whether or
not the contract should be extended. To increase their commitment and
involvement, the experimenter asked the participants to write down some
reasons for their decision. In the meantime, the experimenter collected
the questionnaires with the participants’ decisions and left the room.
Participants were led to believe that the experimenter would photocopy the
questionnaires and those of the participants’ (bogus) partners. In reality, the
experimenter picked up two prepared photocopies of decision question-
naires for each participant. After she returned, she told the participants that
they would now be informed about the decisions of two other randomly cho-
sen participants and handed out the prepared photocopies to each partici-
pant. In the homogeneous feedback conditions, the two other participants
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had made the same decision as the respective participant. In the majority
feedback conditions, one of the two other participants had come to the same
decision as the participant and the other had made a different decision. In the
minority feedback conditions, both of the other participants had come to a
different decision. Finally, in the no feedback conditions, participants did not
receive any information about the decisions of the other participants.
In addition to the photocopies, the experimenter also handed out a ques-
tionnaire. This questionnaire introduced the other experimental factor,
anticipation of group interaction. In the conditions with anticipated group
interaction, participants were told that after reviewing some more informa-
tion they would discuss the case with the two participants about whose
decisions they had been informed beforehand and that the three of them
would then make a final group decision. Thus, participants in the conditions
with anticipated group interaction received the same instruction as in the
study by Levine and Russo (1995). In the conditions with no anticipated
group interaction, participants were told that after reviewing some more
information they would be asked to make a final decision about the man-
ager’s future individually. Hence, as in the study by Nemeth and Rogers
(1996), participants expected no interaction with each other. Subsequently,
participants in both conditions were requested to rate how confident they
were about the correctness of their preliminary decision.
Thereafter, the information search was introduced. Participants were
informed that additional information about the decision case was available.
They were led to believe that 12 experts had been asked to develop prog-
noses about the future performance of the fashion store should Mr. Miller’s
contract be extended. The experts’ statements were said to be about one page
in length each. Participants received an overview sheet that characterized
each statement by its main thesis. The main thesis contained the central
argument of the corresponding statement and left no doubt about whether
the expert had voted for or against extending the contract. An example of a
main thesis in favor of an extension read, “Mr. Miller was able to gain new
customers for the fashion store and this shows that his marketing concepts
appeal to new customer sections. This competitive advantage will increas-
ingly pay off in the future. Thus, his contract should be extended.” An
example for a main thesis against an extension of Mr. Miller’s contract read,
“The teen fashion line introduced by Mr. Miller is nothing new on the
market and his sales strategy is not very innovative. Furthermore, he has not
developed any new business concepts. Thus, his contract should not be
extended.”
Mojzisch et al. / Confirmatory Information Search 211
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There were 6 main theses in favor of and 6 main theses against an exten-
sion of the contract. Therefore, irrespective of whether participants had
voted for or against extending the contract, one half of the statements sup-
ported their decision and the other half conflicted with it. Participants were
asked to select exactly 6 statements that they wanted to read. More specif-
ically, for each of the 12 theses, they were instructed to tick yes if they
wanted to read the corresponding statement or no if they did not want to
read it (with the restriction that they had to select 6 statements in total). The
confirmation bias was computed as the difference between the number of
chosen supporting and the number of chosen conflicting statements. Hence,
positive numbers indicate a confirmatory bias, whereas negative numbers
indicate a disconfirmatory bias.
After participants had filled in the information search questionnaire,
they completed a suspicion check. Thereafter, participants were thanked
and fully debriefed, especially with regard to why no reading of the
requested statements was necessary.
Results
Check for Possible Confounds and Manipulation Checks
Data from 13 participants had to be discarded. Of these participants, 4
guessed the correct hypotheses in the suspicion check. In 8 cases, the ques-
tionnaires were filled in incompletely or incorrectly. Finally, 1 participant
obviously misunderstood the anticipation instruction. Of the remaining 157
participants, 127 voted in favor of and 30 against extending the contract. No
significant differences between these two groups were observed in the
information search and confidence ratings.
To check for our manipulation of preference feedback, we asked partic-
ipants at the end of the experimental session to recall the participants’ deci-
sions about which they had been informed beforehand. All participants
correctly answered this question.
In all of the following analyses, statistical tests were evaluated at alpha = .05
Information Search
To assess the effect of feedback about others’ opinions and anticipation of
group interaction on confirmatory information search, we calculated a 4 (feed-
back about others’opinions: homogeneous feedback vs. majority feedback vs.
212 Small Group Research
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minority feedback vs. no feedback) × 2 (anticipation of group interaction:
yes vs. no) between-subjects ANOVA on the confirmation bias. Although
the main effects for preference feedback and anticipation of interaction
were not significant, F(3, 149) = 1.16, p = .328, η2 = .020, and F(1, 149) =
2.62, p = .107, η2 = .015, respectively, we observed the expected significant
interaction of preference feedback and anticipation of discussion, F(3, 149) =
5.40, p = .001, η2 = .095. Follow-up one-way ANOVAs showed that the
preference feedback factor had a significant effect on the confirmation bias
both for participants anticipating group interaction, F(3, 75) = 3.56, p = .018,
η2 = .125, and for those not anticipating group interaction, F(3, 74) = 3.10,
p = .032, η2 = .112. Figure 1 illustrates the interactive effects of knowledge
about others’ opinions and anticipation of discussion on confirmatory infor-
mation search.
To examine this interaction more closely, we computed separate post
hoc comparisons (least significant difference [LSD] method) for those par-
ticipants anticipating interaction and for those not anticipating interaction.
In the conditions with no anticipated interaction, participants who had
received minority feedback (M = –1.60, SD = 3.35) significantly differed
from participants who had received majority feedback (M = 1.10, SD = 3.40;
p = .006), homogeneous feedback (M = 0.55, SD = 2.96; p = .027), and no
feedback (M = 0.44, SD = 2.01; p = .040). There were no significant differ-
ences among the latter three conditions (all p values > .50). Separate t tests
against zero revealed a significant disconfirmation bias for participants who
had received minority feedback, t(19) = –2.14, p = .046. By contrast, partici-
pants who had received no feedback, homogeneous feedback, or majority
feedback did not show a significant confirmation bias (all p values > .16).
In the conditions with anticipated interaction, a completely different pat-
tern of results emerged. Participants who had received minority feedback
(M = 1.70, SD = 2.10) and those who had received homogeneous feedback
(M = 1.70, SD = 2.77) both differed from each of the other two conditions.
Specifically, participants who had received minority feedback (M = 1.70,
SD = 2.10) significantly differed from participants who had received major-
ity feedback (M = 0.20, SD = 2.24; p = .014) and from those who had
received no feedback (M = 0.11, SD = 2.45; p = .041). Similarly, partici-
pants who had received homogeneous feedback (M = 1.70, SD = 2.77) sig-
nificantly differed from participants who had received majority feedback
(M = 0.20, SD = 2.24; p = .014) and from those who had received no feed-
back (M = 0.11, SD = 2.45; p = .041). All other differences were not sig-
nificant (all p values > .65). Separate t tests against zero revealed a
significant confirmation bias for participants who had received minority
Mojzisch et al. / Confirmatory Information Search 213
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feedback, t(19) = 3.66, p = .002, and for those who had received homogeneous
feedback, t(19) = 2.74, p = .013. By contrast, participants in the other two con-
ditions did not show a significant confirmation bias (both p values > .69).
In addition, we also examined the simple effects of anticipated group
interaction within each level of preference feedback. Anticipated interac-
tion significantly affected only minority members: As predicted, minority
members who anticipated a discussion (M = 1.70, SD = 2.10) significantly
differed from minority members who did not anticipate a discussion (M =
–1.60, SD = 3.35), F(1, 38) = 14.03, p < .001, η2 = .27. By contrast, in the
other three feedback conditions, there was no significant effect of antici-
pated interaction on confirmation bias (all p values > .16).
Confidence
As expected, in the 4 × 2 ANOVA, a significant main effect for prefer-
ence feedback emerged, F(3, 149) = 8.44, p = .001, η2 = .143. Post hoc
comparisons (LSD method) revealed that participants in the minority con-
ditions (M = 5.50, SD = 2.27) were less confident about the correctness of
214 Small Group Research
Figure 1
Confirmation Bias as a Function of Feedback
About Others’ Opinions and Anticipated Discussion
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their decision than were participants in the majority conditions (M = 7.37,
SD = 1.75; p < .001), the homogeneous conditions (M = 7.42, SD = 1.84;
p < .001), and the no feedback conditions (M = 6.65, SD = 1.87; p = .011).
There was neither a main effect for anticipation of discussion, F(1, 149) =
0.80, p = .37, η2 = .005, nor an interaction between preference feedback and
anticipation of discussion, F(3, 149) = 0.48, p = .70, η2 = .008. Table 1 sum-
marizes the means and standard deviations of the confidence ratings.
Mediation Analyses
The analyses thus far support our hypothesis that the impact of knowl-
edge about others’ opinions on confirmatory information search is moder-
ated by anticipated group interaction. Moreover, the results show that the
awareness of being in the minority undermines one’ s confidence about the
correctness of the decision. The final stage in the analyses was to test
whether the impact of preference feedback on confirmatory information
search is mediated by the level of confidence.
We first performed the mediation analysis for those participants who did
not anticipate a discussion. Consistent with the effect of preference feedback
on confirmatory information search reported above, we dummy coded the
preference feedback factor such that the minority condition was contrasted
with the three other preference feedback conditions. As predicted, preference
feedback had a significant effect on both the confirmation bias (i.e., the
dependent variable; β = –.32, p = .004) and the confidence (i.e., the mediator;
β = –.30, p = .008). When both preference feedback and confidence were
Mojzisch et al. / Confirmatory Information Search 215
Table 1
Means of Confidence as a Function of Preference
Feedback and Anticipation of Discussion
Feedback About Others’ Opinions
No Preference Homogeneous Majority Minority
Feedback Feedback Feedback Feedback
Anticipation of Discussion M SD M SD M SD M SD
No anticipated discussion 6.33 1.88 7.10 2.17 7.50 1.88 5.45 2.72
Anticipated discussion 6.95 1.87 7.75 1.41 7.25 1.65 5.55 1.76
Note: n = 20, except for the conditions with no preference feedback (n = 18 for no antici-
pated discussion, n = 19 for anticipated discussion).
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simultaneously entered into the regression, confidence turned out to be a
significant predictor of the confirmation bias (β = .42, p < .001), whereas
preference feedback was no longer a significant predictor (β = –.20, p =
.06). According to a Sobel (1982) test of mediation, the difference in regres-
sion weights was significant (z = –2.24, p < .05). The results of this medi-
ation analysis are summarized in Figure 2.
For participants anticipating group interaction, it is quite obvious that no
such mediation is possible because the pattern of results for the confirma-
tion bias does not correspond to the pattern of results for confidence. To fur-
ther illustrate this, in a simple regression analysis, confidence was not
significantly associated with the confirmation bias (β = .08, p = .46). For a
more detailed analysis, we examined the relation between confidence and
confirmation bias in each of the four preference feedback conditions. For
participants who received homogeneous feedback, a significant positive
correlation between confidence and confirmation bias emerged (β = .57,
p = .008). Conversely, for participants who received minority feedback, the
results revealed a significant negative correlation between confidence and
confirmation bias (β = –.56, p = .011). In the other two feedback conditions,
the correlation between confirmation bias and confidence was not significant
(all p values > .19).
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Figure 2
Mediation Analysis for the Condition Without Anticipated Group
Interaction With Preference Feedback as the Independent
Variable, Confidence as the Mediator, and Confirmation
Bias as the Dependent Variable
  
Confidence 
        .42 
Preference
Feedback 
Confirmation
Bias
−.32a  (−.20b) 
−.30
Note: Path coefficients are standardized beta coefficients.
a. Beta weight for preference feedback without controlling for confidence (simple linear
regression).
b. Beta weight for preference feedback when confidence is controlled for (multiple linear
regression).
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Discussion
The main purpose of the present experiment was to clarify the contra-
dictory results that had been obtained in previous studies on the impact of
knowledge about others’ opinions on confirmatory information search.
Although Levine and Russo (1995) observed that minority members were
particularly biased in favor of supporting information, Nemeth and Rogers
(1996) obtained the opposite result, that is, minority members showed a
preference for conflicting information. We hypothesized that these incom-
patible results could be accounted for by the fact that participants in the
first study anticipated a group discussion, whereas participants in the sec-
ond study were merely informed about the opinions of other participants.
By building on the multiple-motive HSM (Chaiken et al., 1996; Chen &
Chaiken, 1999), we proposed that these two experimental settings are
linked to different motivations. The mere awareness of being in the minor-
ity (in the absence of anticipated group interaction) should induce a moti-
vation to find out whether the majority position is correct or not. Hence,
people who are exposed to majority dissent, but who do not anticipate a
discussion, should search for information consistent with the majority
position on the basis of accuracy concerns. By contrast, if minority
members anticipate a discussion, they should be motivated to bolster and
justify their position by searching for supporting information on the basis
of self-presentation concerns.
Our results provide clear-cut evidence for this hypothesis. In the condi-
tions with no anticipated group interaction, minority members, but not
majority members, showed a pronounced preference for conflicting infor-
mation (as observed by Nemeth & Rogers, 1996). By contrast, minority
members anticipating a group interaction showed a substantially higher
confirmation bias than did majority members anticipating a group interac-
tion (as observed by Levine & Russo, 1995).
A second goal of the present study was to shed light on the processes
underlying the effect of knowledge about others’ opinions on confirmatory
information search. We proposed that the mere awareness of being in the
minority undermines one’s level of confidence about the correctness of
one’s decision. This decrease in confidence, in turn, was predicted to result
in a decreased confirmation bias based on a motivation to test whether the
majority is correct or not. The results of a mediation analysis support this
prediction. For participants in the conditions without anticipated group
interaction, confidence ratings mediated the effect of being in a minority on
confirmatory information search.
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In the conditions with anticipated group interaction a more complex pat-
tern emerged: For both participants in the homogeneous feedback condition
and participants in the minority feedback condition, a strong confirmation
bias was found. The information search behavior in these two feedback
conditions, however, seems to be born of different motivations. For partic-
ipants in the homogeneous condition, there was a significant positive cor-
relation between confidence and confirmation bias. In other words, the
more confident these participants became as a consequence of learning that
the other group members in the forthcoming discussion held the same opin-
ion as they did, the less interested they were in reading contradicting infor-
mation. This result is in line with previous studies showing that the strong
confirmation bias of homogenous groups is based on overconfidence and
closed-mindedness (e.g., Schulz-Hardt et al., 2000). By contrast, the strong
confirmation bias of minority members who anticipated a group interaction
seems to be based on a motivation to seek all the ammunition they can get
to persuade the majority. This idea is corroborated by the finding that for
minority members who anticipated a group interaction, a significant nega-
tive correlation emerged between confidence and confirmation bias. The
less confident minority members were about the correctness of their deci-
sion, the more they searched for confirming information—presumably
because of the fact that this information might compensate for their lack of
confidence in the forthcoming discussion with the majority. The results
hence suggest that different motivational processes may lead to the same
observable information search behavior.
The third goal of the present experiment was to extend previous research
on biased information search by including a homogeneous feedback condi-
tion. The results revealed that for participants without anticipated interac-
tion, there were no significant information search differences among
homogeneous feedback, majority feedback, or no feedback. By contrast, in
the anticipated interaction condition, participants who received homoge-
neous feedback exhibited a substantially higher confirmation bias than did
participants who received majority feedback or no feedback. One explana-
tion for this finding could be that social consensus per se does not result in
closed-mindedness unless individuals expect to interact with the agreeing
others. Thus, individuals who receive homogeneous feedback but who do
not anticipate a discussion may still focus on finding out whether their decision
is right or wrong (based on accuracy concerns). By contrast, if individuals
anticipate a discussion with others who all have the same opinion, they
anticipate that hardly anyone in the group will be interested in counterar-
guments, and their cognitive focus may shift toward reaching consensus on
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the alternative they all prefer. Consequently, these individuals may exhibit
a strong confirmation bias not only because they are overconfident but also
because searching for conflicting information would be dysfunctional with
regard to the emerging group consensus.
More generally, the present results demonstrate the value of investigating
the cognitive and motivational consequences of anticipated interaction with
majorities or minorities. During the past decades, a great deal of research
has compared influence processes exerted by minorities versus majorities
(Moscovici, 1994; Wood, Lundgren, Ouellette, Busceme, & Blackstone,
1994). This research has led to several widely accepted conclusions, such as,
for example, that minorities stimulate divergent thinking (cf. Nemeth, 1986).
Notwithstanding the value of this research, it should be stressed that large
parts of it have been carried out within a social influence paradigm in which
participants neither anticipated interacting nor actually interacted with others
who disagreed. The present study goes beyond this research by highlighting
the impact of anticipated group interaction. In this regard, it is important to
note that only in the condition with no anticipated group interaction are our
findings consistent with Nemeth’s (1986) minority influence model, accord-
ing to which individuals exposed to minority dissent (i.e., majority members)
are stimulated to consider multiple sides of an issue, whereas individuals
exposed to majority dissent (i.e., minority members) focus on the viewpoint
held by the majority and search for information supporting the majority view.
Thus, our finding that minority members who anticipated a group discussion
were particularly biased toward information supporting their own opinion is
at odds with Nemeth’s model.
Limitations and Future Research
One limitation of the present study should be taken into account: To
explore the processes underlying the information search effects, we mea-
sured the participants’ level of confidence and examined the relationship
between confidence ratings and confirmation bias. As such, the evidence
that the information search effects were born of different motives is rather
indirect. Notwithstanding this limitation, it is important to note that our
results nicely tie in with recent work showing the importance of interper-
sonal goals in information search (Jonas et al., 2005; Lundgren & Prislin,
1998). Clearly, an important avenue for future research is to take a closer
look at the motivational processes underlying information search in such
interpersonal situations.
Mojzisch et al. / Confirmatory Information Search 219
 at LMU Muenchen on June 17, 2013sgr.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
Future studies may also examine whether the effect of learning other
persons’ opinions on biased information search is moderated by framing the
additional information available as coming from experts (as in the present
study) or from other participants. Although previous research found that
framing the information as coming from experts as compared to coming
from other participants has no reliable effect on biased information search
(cf. Frey, 1986), the results may look different if participants are led to
believe that the articles available had been written by those participants
about whose opinions they have been informed.
Another line of research worth pursuing involves investigating whether
the combined effect of discussion anticipation and knowledge about others’
opinions varies as a function of the anticipated group task. For example,
Wittenbaum, Merry, and Stasser (1996) showed that the kind of information
that group members attended to in anticipation of discussion depended on
whether the anticipated group task was decision making or collective recall.
In the domain of biased information search, Kerschreiter et al. (in press)
found that homogeneous groups displayed a strong confirmation bias when
anticipating having to give reasons for their decision but a balanced infor-
mation search or even a disconfirmation bias when anticipating having to
invalidate counterarguments (at least when the groups’ confidence in the
correctness of their decision did not exceed moderate levels). In the present
study, participants anticipated group decision making. Because minority
members anticipating a collective recall task (compared to group decision
making) may not feel a need to bolster their position, it is conceivable that
they search for information in a balanced or even self-critical way. Therefore,
testing whether the anticipated group task moderates the information search
of minority members is an important area for future research.
Furthermore, it is interesting to compare our findings with those obtained
in studies in which information search was measured at the group level
(Schulz-Hardt et al., 2000; Schulz-Hardt et al., 2002). As we have already
outlined in the introduction, homogeneous groups (i.e., groups in which all
members favor the same decision alternative) show a clear confirmation
bias, whereas heterogeneous groups (consisting of a majority and a minor-
ity faction) search for information in a relatively balanced way. This finding
is not simply because of aggregated individual confirmation biases. Thus,
heterogeneous groups were even less biased than one would expect on the
basis of their members’ individual information requests prior to discussion.
Now, if all group members have a preference for information supporting
their position (as shown in the individual baseline measurement), the debi-
asing effect of preference heterogeneity is possible only if the confirmation
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bias of minority members becomes substantially higher than that of major-
ity members in the group situation (because in heterogeneous groups the
bias of minority members runs counter to the majority bias). Note that this
is exactly what we found in the condition with anticipated group interaction:
Participants who anticipated being minority members in a group discussion
showed a substantially higher confirmation bias than did participants who
anticipated being majority members. Furthermore, we found that partici-
pants who anticipated a discussion and received homogeneous feedback
showed a substantially higher confirmation bias than did participants in the
no feedback condition who received no preference feedback—a result that
is again congruent with the findings obtained in studies in which confirma-
tion bias was measured at the group level (Schulz-Hardt et al., 2000; Schulz-
Hardt et al., 2002). It is thus possible that the tendency of homogeneous
groups to be closed-minded (Tjosvold, Johnson, & Lerner, 1981), to be over-
confident (Sniezek, 1992), and to prefer supporting to conflicting informa-
tion (Schulz-Hardt et al., 2000; Schulz-Hardt et al., 2002) may reflect not
influence processes during discussion but rather individual processes insti-
gated by anticipated interaction with agreeing others. Testing this possibility
by comparing the differences between anticipated group interaction and
actual group interaction represents an interesting topic for further research.
Finally, future research is called for to examine information-seeking
activities during discussion. Unfortunately, studies of simultaneous majority
and minority influence in interacting groups are far less frequent in the lit-
erature than are studies on individual-level effects of majority and minority
influence. Although it would be tempting to transfer the data from the pre-
sent study to information seeking during discussion, caution is warranted.
For example, in a study on group information pooling, Schulz-Hardt,
Brodbeck, Mojzisch, Kerschreiter, and Frey (2006) also compared the infor-
mation exchange behavior of majority as compared to minority members. It
was surprising that there were no differences, neither with regard to the bias
favoring shared information nor with regard to the bias favoring preference-
consistent information (i.e., information supporting the group members’
prediscussion preferences). Therefore, findings from the individual-level
context do not necessarily generalize to freely interacting groups.
In summary, further research is called for to fully understand the cogni-
tive and motivational consequences of knowledge about others’ opinions.
Our results suggest that new insights can be gained by investigating the dif-
ferences between (a) the mere awareness that others hold a similar or a dif-
ferent position, (b) the anticipated interaction with others who agree or
disagree, and (c) the actual interaction with these others.
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